Introduction
* The notion that commitment is valuable has long been a critical insight of noncooperative game theory, and it has deeply affected a number of social science fields, including industrial organization, the theory of firms and organizations, and international trade and information economics. In a thought-provoking article, Bagwell (1995) has argued that the value of commitment may vanish if the first mover's action is imperfectly observed. In particular, Bagwell considers the traditional leader-follower setting, only amended by the presence of a noise in the observation of the leader's action. Assuming that the support of the signal observed by the follower is independent of the leader's action,' he shows that the pure-strategy equilibrium set of this game coincides with that of the associated simultaneous-move game, even if the noise is very slight.
The simple logic behind this result is the following. In a pure-strategy equilibrium, the follower knows which action has been taken by the leader. Therefore he will disregard the signal and choose a best reply to the equilibrium action of the leader. But then the leader has an incentive to deviate from the Stackelberg action and choose a best response to the follower's action. Thus, the only pure-strategy equilibrium is the Cournot equilibrium. the leader's type. As this ratio increases, the equilibrium outcome goes smoothly from the Stackelberg outcome to the simultaneous-move outcome. Thus, the model suggests a reinterpretation of the classic Stackelberg model, which was seriously questioned by Bagwell's irrelevance result: the Stackelberg outcome can be interpreted as applying to situations where the observation noise is small relative to the uncertainty in the leader's type.
The other insight offered by the model is that the leader's payoff increases with the amount of purely private information. Notice that purely private information has an impact on the value of commitment only under imperfect observability: in the benchmark case where the leader's action is perfectly observed, purely private information is inconsequential, as the equilibrium outcome coincides with the Stackelberg outcome. Thus, the role of purely private information can be captured only by noisycommitment models, like the present one. The conclusion that purely private information benefits the first mover stands in apparent contrast with signalling models, such as Gal-Or (1987) and Mailath (1993) : in these models, the presence of private information typically damages the first mover because of the signalling distortions that arise in equilibrium.4 These results should be viewed as complementary. They suggest that in the presence of imperfect observability, the value of commitment is increased by purely private information (e.g., information about own cost), but tends to be decreased by follower-relevant private information (e.g., information about demand). My model isolates the first effect, which has not been identified in the previous literature.
The linear-normal specification of the model also generates two positive predictions that are relevant for the interpretation of the model as an incumbent-entrant game 'a la Dixit (1980) . The first prediction is that equilibrium market shares should be more uneven when the entrant can observe the incumbent's capacity more accurately. For example, this could be the case when competitors are geographically closer. Second, the model predicts more asymmetric market shares in situations where cost uncertainty is higher and the incumbent is better informed about costs than the potential entrant.
Finally, I examine the robustness of the model's predictions to the possibility of direct information disclosure by the leader, prior to the market game. The literature on information disclosure has shown that if certain conditions are satisfied, private information is entirely disclosed in equilibrium. In the present context, the question is whether the possibility of disclosure might neutralize the effects of private information, thereby neutralizing the role of commitment. I find that if the signal noise is small, commitment need not be neutralized by the possibility of disclosure, but if the signal noise is large, the first-mover advantage is wiped out. In other words, if disclosure is possible, commitment has either high value or none at all.
In the literature, an article that is closely related to the present one is van Damme and Hurkens (1997). They consider a discrete-action, complete-information version of the noisy-commitment game, and they show that if the noise is small, there exists a mixed-strategy equilibrium that is close to the Stackelberg outcome, in addition to the Cournot equilibrium (no results are available if the noise is not small).5 Thus, if one looks at the full set of Nash equilibria of the complete-information game, a role for commitment may reappear (if the noise is small), but only for one of the equilibria. In contrast, the incomplete-information model examined here has the attractive feature of providing considerably sharper predictions. In particular, if the noise in the leader's action is small, the incomplete-information model predicts a near-Stackelberg outcome (except possibly for the most efficient types), whereas in the van Damme and Hurkens model the equilibrium set includes (at least) a near-Stackelberg outcome and the Cournot outcome. Another advantage of the approach followed here is that if one is willing to impose more structure on the model (namely, quadratic payoffs and normal distributions), one obtains rich comparative-statics predictions.6
There are several articles in the literature that examine sequential games with private information and imperfectly observed actions. These include the noisy-signalling models of Matthews and Mirman (1983) and Hertzendorf (1993) , and Fudenberg and Levine's (1992) repeated-game model of reputation with imperfect monitoring. Also in these games, Bagwell's irrelevance result does not apply, and the sequence of moves does matter for the equilibrium outcome. However, the focus of these articles is very different from that of the present one, as they are not concerned with the determinants of the first-mover advantage.
The plan of the article is as follows. Section 2 considers the complete-information benchmark. Section 3 examines the incomplete-information setting. Section 4 focuses on the linear-normal specification of the model. Section 5 examines the possibility of direct information disclosure by the leader. Section 6 contains a few concluding remarks. All proofs are in the Appendix.
Complete information
* In this section I present the irrelevance result for the benchmark case of complete information, already shown in a very similar model by Bagwell (1995) . The assumptions of the model are as follows. Firm i's profits (i = I, f) are given by IT(qi, q-). The (common-knowledge) function ir is smooth and satisfies -IT, < IT12 < 0. This ensures existence and uniqueness of the Cournot equilibrium.7 I also make the technical assumption that the feasible set of outputs for each firm is an interval [0, q], with -q higher than the monopoly output q n. Let R(q ) argmaxqi iT(qi, qj) denote the Cournot reaction function, and qC the (symmetric) Cournot output. At time t = 1 the leader chooses q.. At time t = 2 the follower chooses qf, after observing a signal s of the leader's action. The signal has (common-knowledge) conditional density f (s I q) with support (go(qe), gl(q)), where g0(-) and g,(-) are smooth functions satisfying go(qe) < qC < gl(qe). I assume that f is continuous in s on the whole real line; this requires that the density be zero at the extremes of the support.8 I will focus on pure-strategy Nash equilibria. While this focus is potentially restrictive under complete information, it entails no loss of generality under incomplete information, as will become clear in the next section. The leader's and follower's equilibrium strategies will be denoted by qe and qj(s) respectively. Nash equilibrium behavior requires that (i) qe maximizes the leader's payoff given qf(s), and (ii) qf(s) maximizes the follower's payoff given qee for equilibrium realizations of s, i.e., for MAGGI / 559 s E (go(qe), g, (qe)). No restrictions are imposed on qf(s) by the Nash equilibrium concept for off-equilibrium realizations of s, i.e., s X (go(q e), gI(qe)). I first state the result and then provide some intuition for it. Proposition 1. Under complete information, there exists a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium outcome, given by (qc, qc). This result slightly extends Bagwell's (1995) result, in that Bagwell assumes fixed support of the signal whereas I allow the support to move with q.9 To gain intuition, it is useful to focus first on the case of fixed support, i.e., where go and g, are independent of qu. The key is to note that since there are no off-equilibrium events, Nash equilibrium requires that qy(s) be a best response to qe for all s, and hence the follower will play R(qe) regardless of s. In words, the signal adds no useful information given knowledge of the equilibrium action qua. Now suppose the equilibrium specifies q e = qc. The fact that the follower's output is unresponsive to the signal immediately implies that the leader has incentive to deviate and move to her reaction function, i.e., play R[R(qe)], which is different from qe unless qe = qc. With full support, the leader cannot commit to staying away from her reaction function, and this is why only qc can be an equilibrium.
If the support moves with q, the situation is different, because the follower may respond to the signal in case of off-equilibrium realizations and thus can potentially "punish" the leader for a deviation from qe =# qc. However, the expected cost to the leader of a small deviation from qe =# qc is at most of the second order, due to the fact that the density of the signal is zero at the extremes of the support, whereas the expected benefit from moving toward her reaction function is of the first order, hence the Cournot outcome is again the only equilibrium.10 A striking implication of the irrelevance result, as Bagwell points out, is that commitment does not matter even if the signal of the leader's action is very precise. The logic of the irrelevance result has another surprising implication. Suppose that, after q. is chosen, the follower has the option of observing qe perfectly by incurring a cost (whereas a noisy signal can be observed free). It is not hard to see that the follower will not exercise the option in equilibrium, even if the cost is very small, and the unique equilibrium outcome is again (qc, qc).l l The troubling prediction here is that the follower has no incentive to acquire information about the leader's action, since knowledge of the equilibrium strategy is sufficient. This paradox will be resolved in the private-information setting, which I examine in the next section. that for any mixed-strategy equilibrium of this game there exists a pure-strategy equilibrium that yields the same payoffs.
Private information
The second remark concerns the existence of an equilibrium in pure strategies. Existence for games with this structure has been shown recently by Athey (1997). I will not replicate her formal argument here but will point out that a central role in the existence result is played by two assumptions: the single-crossing property of the leader's payoff, which ensures monotonicity of the leader's strategy, and the monotone likelihood ratio property for the signal, which ensures monotonicity of the follower's strategy. We would not know that an equilibrium exists in the absence of these key monotonicity conditions.16 It is hard to characterize the equilibrium set of this game for arbitrary distributions, but something interesting can be said for two extreme cases: the case in which the signal noise is small, and the case in which uncertainty about 0 is small. To formalize the notion of "small" signal noise, I consider a rescaling of the original noise, e = k-e, and focus on the equilibria of the game as the constant k approaches zero. In the following proposition, I let Ocs be defined by qs ( Furthermore, all leader types must produce more than the Cournot output.
The intuition for this result is the following. Under complete information, we saw that the follower does not use the signal to update his beliefs about the leader's output, for the simple fact that he knows the leader's equilibrium output already. If the leader has private information, the follower knows the leader's equilibrium strategy, q e(0), but not the actual level of output. Now the signal does contain useful information, as it can be used to update beliefs about the leader's type 0 and, through this, about the leader's output. Thus, as long as q e(O) is not constant (which can easily be ruled out), the follower is responsive to the signal, and this gives the leader an incentive to "overproduce" relative to the Cournot output.
Reasoning along these lines one can understand why, if the noise is small, the leader's output must be close to the Stackelberg equilibrium, except for a possible interval of pooling. Suppose that q e(O) is decreasing, and that it is lower than qs(O) by a discrete amount. Then an interior type 0' has an incentive to deviate and raise output a bit, "mimicking" a lower-cost leader. The key is to note that if the noise is small, the follower's posterior estimate of q. is approximately equal to the signal realization s, provided this value falls within the equilibrium range of outputs (inf q e(O), sup qee(0)). If an interior type 6' raises output a bit, s will almost surely fall between qe(6') and qs(O'), and within the equilibrium range of outputs. Thus the follower will estimate qe to be approximately equal to s and will respond according to R(s; Of), hence this deviation raises the leader's expected profits.
As Proposition 2 states, pooling in equilibrium is possible for a subset of low-cost types. To understand this, consider an output schedule that is constant at q* for low 0, with q* E [qc(OO), qs(0)], and close to qs(O) elsewhere. Does a low-cost type have / THE RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS incentive to deviate from q*? Deviating downward (toward qc(O)) does not pay, because it amounts to mimicking a higher-cost type and will induce the follower to increase output. Deviating upward (toward qs(O)) does not pay either, because output levels higher than q* are off the equilibrium range, hence the (almost surely) higher realization of the signal will be interpreted as noise and will not affect the follower's response; in other words, upward deviations do not pay because there is no lower-cost type to mimic.
The extent of pooling that can occur in equilibrium, however, is limited. One way to get some intuition about this is to understand why there cannot be complete pooling in equilibrium. Suppose qe(0) = q* in equilibrium. If this were the case, the follower would not use the signal to update beliefs, and hence his strategy qf(s) would be independent of s, say qf*; but knowing this, the leader would play her best response R(qf*; 0), which is decreasing in 0, so complete pooling cannot occur.
Notice that the paradox pointed out at the end of Section 2 disappears under asymmetric information. If the follower can observe q. perfectly by incurring a small cost, he will do so, because observing the leader's actual output has a nonnegligible value, even though he knows the leader's equilibrium strategy. More generally, under private information the follower has a strict incentive to improve the precision of the signal, whereas under complete information he does not.
Note also that Proposition 2 cannot be interpreted as a "purification" (in the Harsanyi sense) of the mixed-strategy equilibria of the complete-information game. I have not considered the limit of a nearby incomplete-information game; rather, I have fixed the distribution of the private information and considered the limit as the noise becomes small. This explains why results are very different from Bagwell's (1995) and van Damme and Hurkens's (1997) results: for example, they find that the Cournot equilibrium always exists, whereas no Cournot equilibrium is possible here.
The other extreme case for which something interesting can be said is the one in which the uncertainty about 0 is small. To formalize the notion of "small" type uncertainty, I assume that the leader's type is given by 0 = 0 + z-u, where u is a random variable with zero mean, smooth density and support [ Condition C requires that the leader's expected payoff be strictly concave, with the concavity bounded away from zero. It is satisfied, loosely speaking, if ir is sufficiently concave in q. and the distribution of e is sufficiently spread. For example, if demand and costs are linear and E is normal, the condition is satisfied if -S2 is sufficiently high (this is shown in the Appendix). This expression has a simple interpretation. The follower's posterior estimate of the leader's output is a linear combination of its prior expectation (which is in turn derived from the prior expectation of 0, using knowledge of the equilibrium output schedule) and the observed signal. Intuitively, the relative weight attached to the signal observation is decreasing in the signal noise (o-2) and increasing in the uncertainty about the leader's cost (o-). If the signal noise is higher, the follower relies 19 I note here that the assumption of normal distributions has the unpleasant implication that equilibrium levels of output can be negative. This is of course a limit of this specification of the model, albeit one shared by many models that assume normal distributions. The two interesting benchmarks for this game are the perfect-information Stackelberg outcome and the simultaneous-move (Nash-Bayes) outcome. It is direct to verify that the leader's output in these two benchmark cases is given respectively by qs(6) = (1 + 0)/2 -0 and qsM(6) = (2 + 0)/6 -0/2. The next proposition relates the equilibrium of this game to these two benchmarks and describes the impact of the information structure on the equilibrium output. interprets o-A as capturing the amount of cost uncertainty, the model predicts that equilibrium market shares are more asymmetric in situations where cost uncertainty is higher.
It is worth emphasizing that while cost uncertainty has no impact on the equilibrium outcome in the benchmark case of perfect observability (in which case the leader produces q,'(6) regardless of 0-2), under imperfect observability it affects the outcome in a critical way: higher ,-2 implies more-asymmetric market shares. Moreover, the impact of o-on the outcome is bigger if the signal noise is higher (it is direct to verify that aqlabo21 is increasing in os). Conversely, the model predicts that a change in the signal noise has a bigger impact on the equilibrium outcome when 0d' is lower. The next step is to explore the impact of the information structure, as summarized by V, on the leader's equilibrium payoff. The next proposition, illustrated in Figure 1 Thus far I have not said anything precise about the value of commitment. This is defined as the difference between the leader's equilibrium payoff in the sequential game and in the simultaneous-move game, for a given information structure (here, for a given V). Evaluating this difference involves a comparison across two different games, but notice that the outcome of the simultaneous-move game is the same as that of the sequential game with V -> o0, so examining the value of commitment boils down to a comparative-statics exercise within the sequential game. The following is a straightforward corollary of the previous proposition. Corollary 1. There exist two critical levels 0 and 6 (0 < 0) such that (i) types below 0 gain from commitment regardless of V, (ii) types above 6 lose from commitment regardless of V, and (iii) types 0 E (0, 6) gain from commitment if and only if V is sufficiently high. Commitment here has two effects. First, it implies that the leader's cost gets partially revealed through the signal. This "revelation" effect is negative for high-cost types and positive for low-cost types. High-cost types would rather get pooled with lower-cost types, thus they do not like commitment. Second, commitment gives the leader a chance to influence the follower's beliefs about 0 and hence about qf, thereby affecting the follower's choice of output; I will label this the "influence" effect of commitment. In principle, it is not clear whether the influence effect of commitment is beneficial to the leader, since Corollary 1 informs us only about the total effect of Corollary 2. Ex ante, the leader's equilibrium payoff is higher than in the associated simultaneous-move game: ETre > E7rsM. Also, the value of commitment is decreasing in V.
Before concluding the section, I should discuss the relation between my model and the signalling models of Gal-Or (1987) and Mailath (1993). In these models, the leader has private information about demand, and the follower observes the leader's output without noise. One common aspect is that commitment may be disadvantageous for certain types of leader. The first-mover disadvantage in signalling models arises because all types of leader (except the lowest-demand type) are induced to distort output downward in order to credibly signal their type to the follower. This is different from the revelation effect that arises in my model, which is not germane to signalling. One way to see the difference is that the revelation effect in my model is negative for above-average cost types and positive for below-average cost types, and it washes out in the average: in ex ante terms, the leader always likes commitment. In Gal-Or (1987) and Mailath (1993), the signalling distortion affects almost all types, so in ex ante terms the leader may lose from commitment.
More important, the impact of private information in signalling models is strikingly different than it is in the present model. In signalling models, private information damages the first mover, because of the signalling distortions that arise in equilibrium. In the present model, private information benefits the first mover, because it confers the signal informative value that it does not have under symmetric information. This suggests that under imperfect observability, private information increases the value of commitment if it is idiosyncratic (e.g., private information about own cost), but it may well decrease the value of commitment if it is directly relevant to the follower (e.g., information about demand). The model examined here disentangles the first effect from the second.
?a RAND 1999. Intuition can be gained by thinking in terms of a two-type model. If the noise is large, we know that the equilibrium outcome absent disclosure possibilities is close to 22 One limitation of the analysis in this section is that the focus on pure strategies is potentially restrictive. This is because in the subgame starting at t = 1 there may be complete information, and under complete information the restriction to pure strategies is not without loss of generality.
(C RAND 1999. the Nash-Bayes outcome.23 Now consider the low-cost type's incentive to disclose: if she discloses, she gets the Cournot equilibrium payoff (from Bagwell's irrelevance result), but this is higher than the Nash-Bayes equilibrium payoff for the low-cost type, hence she has incentive to disclose. This implies that the high-cost type as well is revealed in the pregame stage, so all information is disclosed. As a consequence, the ensuing game is played under complete information, so the role of commitment is neutralized. Next, suppose that the signal noise is small. In this case, we know that the equilibrium outcome absent disclosure possibilities is close to the Stackelberg outcome, and both types are better off under private information than under complete information. It is then intuitive that disclosure need not occur in equilibrium.
The conclusion is that the possibility of information disclosure can indeed neutralize the role of commitment, but this is subject to an important qualification: If commitment has an important impact absent disclosure opportunities (i.e., if o-1 is small), commitment need not be neutralized by the opportunity of disclosure. On the other hand, if commitment has little impact to start with (i.e., if oJ2 is large), it will be made irrelevant by the endogenous disclosure of information. Second, under imperfect observability, the value of commitment increases with the degree of the leader's purely private information. This contrasts sharply with the prediction of most signalling models, where private information typically damages the first mover because of the signalling distortions that arise in equilibrium. Taken together, these results suggest that under imperfect observability, the value of commitment is increased by follower-irrelevant private information (e.g., information about own cost) but tends to be decreased by private information that is directly relevant to the follower (e.g., information about demand). My model isolates the first effect, which had not been identified in the previous literature. Third, the model offers two positive predictions that are interesting for the interpretation of the leader-follower game as a Dixit-type model of entry. First, equilibrium market shares should be more asymmetric when the potential entrant can observe the incumbent's capacity more accurately, perhaps because the two firms are geographically closer. Second, market shares should be more asymmetric in industries where cost uncertainty is higher and the incumbent is better informed about costs than the potential entrant.
Conclusion
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Proof of Proposition 1. It is obvious that the Cournot outputs constitute a Nash equilibrium outcome. This outcome is supported by the strategies qt = qc and qf(s) = qc. Next I establish that there are no other purestrategy equilibrium outcomes.
Suppose by contradiction that the leader's equilibrium output qe is different from qc, and consider the leader's incentive to deviate from q e. The case qt' < q' is easily contradicted, as the leader would have all the incentive to increase output. Let us focus on the case q e > qc. I shall show that it is profitable for the leader to reduce output slightly, say to qt -8. 
